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Network devices are left with packet forwarding while
the network control is done in a centralized entity
named “SDN controller”. The network control allows
the operator of the network to route the traffic in his
infrastructure so it can follow specific paths or meet
specific requirements in terms of Quality of Service
(QoS) or security. The programmability of the network
has given developers a lot of flexibility to design new
services and network applications and more specifically
network virtualization.
Network virtualization focuses on sharing network re-
sources among several users while maintaining a certain
level of isolation between each user. The seminal work
on this approach using SDN is FlowVisor [2], in which
the authors have split their production network to have
both experimentation and production traffic on the same
physical equipment without incurring any interference
between both. Even though there has been numerous
studies in the literature about the security of SDN [3],
[4], [5], there are some specific aspects of SDN oper-
ations that have received little attention security-wise,
namely the migration of virtual networks.
The migration is a problem studied as part of the
Virtual Network Embedding (VNE) in which the infras-
tructure provider has to determine which set of physical
resources is best suited to support the operations of
the virtual network. We further refer to this set of
physical resources as the destination substrate. Once the
destination substrate has been determined, the virtual
resources (i.e., network nodes configuration) will be
migrated. If an attacker can impersonate the network
hypervisor he will be able to leverage the migration
process to setup an environment in which he will be
able to exfiltrate sensitive data belonging to the virtual
network owner. In order to do so, he will have to deploy
specific configuration rules inside several network nodes
allowing him to duplicate the sensitive traffic and redirect
1https://github.com/FabienCharmet/MDPRA
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I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud infrastructures have become a major component
of modern businesses as they are an affordable solution
to IT outsourcing. Nowadays, businesses rely on the
cloud to support the operations of front-end and back-
end solutions for a wide range of activities. This leads
these businesses to also store their sensitive data inside
the cloud. Over the past years, a number of data breaches
has occurred in major companies, making it clear that
security should be a concern for both the clients and
the company. In this regard, cloud providers have to
provide an adequate security level for their customers’
information.
Cloud Infrastructures have greatly benefited f rom a
new network paradigm, Software Defined Networking
(SDN), that offer a comprehensive view of cloud re-
sources and access network availability [1]. SDN is
the decoupling of the data plane and the control plane.
it towards an “extraction point” in the infrastructure
(typically a virtual machine inside the cloud).
In order to protect the infrastructure against such
attacks, network monitoring resources must be deployed
on network devices to detect attacks on the migration.
However, such monitoring incurs a financial cost and a
performance impact on the general operation such that
it makes it impossible to deploy security measures in-
side the whole infrastructure. Therefore, determining an
optimal distribution of the monitoring resources on the
network equipments will provide an adequate security
level while meeting the budget’s requirements.
In this paper, we propose to model the migration of
a virtual network inside the cloud infrastructure as well
as the attacker’s strategy. To do so, we have designed
a Markov Decision Process (MDP) that will let the de-
fender choose iteratively where to deploy the monitoring
resources based on the attacker’s methodology. Once the
MDP is generated, we solve it using the MDPToolbox
proposed by Chades et al. [6]. Finally, based on the
MDP solutions, we propose an a priori deployment of
the monitoring so the infrastructure can be optimally
protected.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows:
Section II describes the problem statement and Sec-
tion III the considered attack model. Section IV describes
the assumptions made for this problem. Section V in-
troduces the basics of Markovian Decision Processes
and Section VI describes our proposition of an MDP
to answer the problem statement. We then provide a
numerical application of our scenarios in Section VII
and discuss some findings and limitations of the model in
Section VIII. We present the related work in Section IX.
We finally conclude this paper in Section X.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider an infrastructure provider, referred to as
“defender” for the rest of this paper, offering a network
virtualization service to the users. Network virtualiza-
tion, similarly to legacy host virtualization, is prone to
physical failures and attacks. To address these problems,
the affected virtual network is migrated and new physical
resources (destination substrate) are allocated to support
the operations of the migrated virtual network. The
migration occurs as the configuration rules are sequen-
tially [7] deployed into the destination substrate. The
attacker may exploit this process by altering the configu-
ration of specific nodes to exfiltrate sensitive information
from the migrated virtual network and route it toward an
“extraction” point. The goal of the defender is then to
improve the security of his infrastructure against attacks
on the migration process. In order to do so, he will
deploy monitoring resources that will be used to collect
information about events in the infrastructure. However,
while virtual machines are essentially clustered inside
one physical server, virtual networks are a collection
of distributed resources that can not be monitored at
a single physical point. Therefore, the monitoring has
to be physically distributed as well. Since the defender
is limited by the financial cost of such deployment and
the performance impact incurred by the monitoring, he
aims at finding a cost-effective strategy to select which
nodes should be monitored in the infrastructure in order
to provide the optimal coverage.
Determining which nodes should handle the monitor-
ing inside the infrastructure requires to model several
aspects. The first aspect is the system supporting the
virtual network operations and its internal elements.
This system is composed of physical nodes, using the
Software Defined Networking paradigm to provide an
adaptive solution for network virtualization. These nodes
are connected together and both links and nodes com-
pose what we will further refer to as “the physical
infrastructure”. The second aspect is the migration of
the virtual network to a new physical substrate, thus
having a system evolving independently of the security
measures deployed and the potential attacks happening.
Regarding the security aspect of the operations, the goal
is to determine which nodes the defender should monitor
to detect attacks on his infrastructure, but also take into
account the strategy of the attacker. The last parameter to
account for is the cost of the security deployment since
it represents a financial cost for the defender as well as
a performance impact for the end user.
III. ATTACKER MODEL
Fig. 1 depicts the evolution of the infrastructure once
the attacker makes part of it unavailable. At first, the vir-
tual network is running on a healthy physical substrate;
but once the attack is launched, the substrate becomes
unavailable and the virtual network must be migrated
quickly to reduce the end user’s service interruption.
The success of the attacks on the migration relies on
two main aspects: the ability to affect the configuration
of SDN nodes as well as to retrieve the exfiltrated data.
While the latter can be easily solved by owning virtual
machines in the infrastructure, the former requires to be
able to alter nodes configuration. This has been proven
possible in [8], [9], [10]. Precisely, the attacker is able
to spoof the identity of the network hypervisor, and thus
is able to inject malicious flow rules inside the nodes to
create the data exfiltration path. However, he is not able
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Fig. 1: Migration triggered by the attacker
to be designated as the original network hypervisor in
the nodes’ configurations. This can be explained because
it requires advanced configuration privileges. Moreover,
a physical node missing from the legitimate hypervi-
sor’s topology view is easily detectable, in comparison
to malicious flow rules injected inside the physical
nodes. Even though the virtualization infrastructure hosts
several virtual networks and end users, we limit the
scope of the attacker to a unique target virtual network.
He has been able to determine which nodes to attack
to trigger the migration thanks to prior scanning and
information gathering. Nevertheless, he has no exact
knowledge about which nodes will be selected as the
destination substrate and he will discover it by doing
further scanning and fingerprinting while he is attacking
the infrastructure. Even if the attacker may target all
nodes in the infrastructure, he has no incentives to attack
nodes that will not contribute to exfiltrate data from his
victim’s network.
We can find a description of such techniques in [11],
[12]. This information gathering is not depicted in this
paper and we consider that the attacker will choose his
targets as presented in Section VI-C. From the point
of view of the defender, it is impossible to accurately
know which node will be attacked. The attacker may
own several virtual machines inside the infrastructure,
thus has several sources to launch an attack. However,
he can only attack one node at a time. We suppose that
each node will always be attacked from the same source.
Because of the short time interval considered for the
migration, we suppose that the attack will always take
the same path. This path will be considered to determine
the global detection probability of the attack.
IV. ASSUMPTIONS
In this section we describe the assumptions we make
to address the problem statement.
A. Migration
All nodes in the original substrate have been fully
compromised by the attacker and thus are not consid-
ered as candidates for the destination substrate. This
assumption is reinforced by the fact that forcing all the
resources to be reallocated could be leveraged by the
attacker in an attempt to have the target virtual network
relocated closer to his virtual machines. Virtual machines
are already subject to such attacks, as presented by
Atya et al. in [13], [14]. The migration will deploy in
the destination substrate all the flow rules necessary to
operate the virtual network properly. The migration of
the virtual nodes is sequential [7], thus all the nodes will
be migrated one at a time. We suppose that both virtual
network and physical infrastructures are static (i.e., the
topology does not change over time).
B. Monitoring
The deployment of the monitoring on the nodes im-
pacts the defender financially and the infrastructure’s
performance. Based on the work of Ismail et al. [15],
we consider the monitoring cost proportional to the
intrinsic value of the nodes, (e.g., CPU time on a
powerful machine is more expensive compared to a
smaller one). Each node on the path of an attack has
the same probability to detect it, e.g., there is no node
more efficient than another.
C. Targeting nodes
During the migration, the attacker may target nodes
to construct the path that will support the exfiltration of
the information. We make the assumption that substrate
nodes are more likely to be attacked since at least one
must be part of the path leading to the exfiltration point.
The attacker’s strategy for choosing which nodes he
attacks is based on the information gathering he performs
while attacking. The details of such activity is considered
out of the scope of this paper. Similar work on cloud
environments for virtual machines colocation has been
proposed in [16], [17]. Johnson et al. propose in [18] a
real time metric that determines the node that is the most
likely to be the next target of an attack. If the attacker
was able to establish the full path then we consider that
the global attack was successful.
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Fig. 2: Exfiltrating information via unauthorized routing
V. BACKGROUND OF MARKOV DECISION PROCESSES
In this section we give a formal definition of a
Markov Decision Process (MDP) and present a common
algorithm to solve it.
A. Definition
An MDP is a formalism used to represent the evolu-
tion of a system based on the decisions made by an agent.
These decisions may reward the agent and cause the
system to evolve, according to a certain transition prob-
ability function. Formally, a Markov Decision Process
is defined by a 4-tuple < S,A, P (s, s′, a), R(s, a, s′) >
where S is a finite set of states, A is a finite set of actions,
P (s, s′, a) is a transition probability function to go from
state s to s′ when choosing action a ∈ A and finally
R(s, a, s′) is the immediate reward gained by choosing
a and transitioning from state s to s′. R(s, a, s′) is
sometimes simplified to R(s, a) in the literature. Actions
may reward the agent and can lead the system to evolve
from its current state to another. The aim of an MDP
is to determine an optimal policy, defining for each
state which action will maximize the reward gained by
the user while accounting for the consequences of an
immediate choice.
B. Solving an MDP
The solution of an MDP consists in determining the
action that will maximize the immediate and future
rewards for each existing state.
1) The Bellman equation: The Bellman equation [19],
shown in Fig. 3 lays the groundwork for solving MDPs
using dynamic programming.
This equation states that the optimal utility expected
from state s is the sum of the reward obtained when
entering state s and the expected discounted sum of
probable utilities of the neighbours of s. γ represents
the discount factor for the future reward.
The solution of a MDP is the optimal policy pi(s),
which is a vector defining the optimal action for each
possible state in the MDP. We propose to determine
U(s) = max
a
{
R(s, a) + γ
∑
s′
P (s, a, s′)U(s′)
}
Fig. 3: Bellman’s equation
the optimal policy using the well known Value Iteration
algorithm.
2) Value Iteration Algorithm: This algorithm takes an
iterative approach to determine the value of each state
in the MDP with the Bellman equation. Value Iteration
works as follows:
1) Initialize a value vector U0(s) = 0, ∀s ∈ S
2) Determine the utility of each state iteratively
Uk+1(s) = max
a
{
R(s, a) + γ
∑
s′
P (s, a, s′)Uk(s′)
}
3) Repeat step 2 until Uk(s) converges
4) Compute the optimal policy pi(s)
pi(s) = arg max
a
{
R(s, a) + γ
∑
s′
P (s, a, s′)U(s′)
}
VI. MODEL
In this section, we describe our MDP model to address
the problem of optimal defense resource allocation for
virtual network migration.
A. States
The states in the MDP represent the evolution of the
system, the progress of the migration, the remaining
budgets as well as the compromised nodes in the infras-
tructure. The defender has two different budgets: bf , the
financial budget for setting and maintaining monitoring,
and bc the global computational power available for
the monitoring. Precisely, bc corresponds to the overall
performance impact caused by the monitoring. This
represents the amount of resources that can be spent to
perform monitoring instead of operational tasks.
We describe the state of the system as the following
tuple: s =< bf , bc,Mi,Mo,At >:
• n: The number of nodes in the infrastructure.
• N = {1, .., n} is the set of nodes in the infrastruc-
ture.
• Mis ⊂ N is the set of currently migrated nodes for
state s ∈ S.
• Mos ⊂ N is the set of currently monitored nodes
for state s ∈ S.
• Ats ⊂ N is the set of compromised nodes for state
s ∈ S.
• bsf is the remaining financial budget of state s.
• bsc is the remaining computational power of state s.
An absorbing state is a state where all actions transi-
tion back to itself.
B. Actions
The defender can either add monitoring on a particular
node in the infrastructure, remove this monitoring, or
choose to do nothing. The option of doing nothing pre-
vents counter-productive options like forcing undesired
actions (e.g., unjustified unmonitoring). We note mj the
action of setting up monitoring on node j. Similarly, we
note uj the action of removing monitoring on node j.
Finally we note d the action of doing nothing.
We define A = {m1, ..,mn, u1, .., un, d} as the set of
actions available at each state.
C. Probabilistic target determination
We consider the path taken by the attack as a set of
nodes. We define Lj the path leading the attacker to node
j. We note Z the set of non compromised nodes that
are currently embedding the migrated virtual network
(i.e., Z = Mis ∩ Ats). Similarly, we note T the set of
non compromised nodes that are directly connected to a
compromised node and are not part of Z, i.e., they are
potential candidates for the path between attacker and
victim. Alg. 1 is computed at each state as the sets T
and Z are changing.
Algorithm 1: Probabilistic target determination
Input : Z, T, current state s, n nodes
Output: n probabilities to attack each of n nodes
initialization;
foreach node j in {1, .., n} do
if j ∈ Z and Mis ∩Ats = {∅} then
q(j) = α 33|Z|+|T|
else if j ∈ T then
q(j) = α 13|Z|+|T|
else
q(j) = 0
We note the probability of a specific node being
attacked as the combination of the probability for an
attack to be launched (i.e., α) and the probability of the
node being chosen among all the nodes in T and Z. We
also use a coefficient (here 3) to give more weight to the
nodes in Z, referring to the assumption made in IV-C.
Once a substrate node has been compromised, the at-
tacker will finalize the exfiltration set-up by completing
the path between his VM and the victim’s network.
D. Transitions
We describe the coherence of the MDP states with the
following transition constraints:
1) If there is no bf budget left, a state cannot transition
to another state (absorbing state)
2) Choosing an action without the required bc budget
will only cost bf budget with no reward
3) As long as there are nodes to be migrated, each
transition will include the migration of one node.
4) A state can only transition to states that preserve
the coherence of parameters (budgets, etc.)
5) If there is an action too expensive for bf it will
consume the remaining bf without any reward
6) Choosing an action twice (i.e., monitoring a node
already monitored) only consumes bf with no re-
ward
Each node j ∈ N is characterized by an intrinsic
value Vj ∈ R that can be seen as the financial value
of the node, its computing capacities and its function
inside the virtualization infrastructure. Considering that
the monitoring cost for each node is not uniform, we
note kf and kc the atomic monitoring costs respectively
associated to budgets bf and bc. Then we define the
monitoring costs cjf and c
j
c for node j as follows:
∀j ∈ N, cjf = kfVj , cjc = kcVj (1)
When in state s and after choosing an action a ∈ A, the
system can transition to |Z| + |T| + 1 states, whether
an attack happened on one of the nodes or no attack
was launched. We define S′ ⊂ S the set of states to
which the state s can transition to with a non null
probability. We note s′a,j ∈ S′ the state depending on
which action a has been chosen and which node will
be attacked (index j), and if no attack was launched we
note s′a ∈ S′. To ease the reading we simplify s′a,j and
s′a to s
′ for the rest of this paper. We define the state
modifications once action a ∈ A has been chosen.
State modifications for action mi: when choosing
action mi at state s, we compute the budget impact and
set changes for state s′,∀j ∈ N.
s −→ s′ =

bs
′
f = b
s
f − cif
bs
′
c = b
s
c − cic
Mos
′
= Mos ∪ {i}
Ats
′
= Ats ∪ {j} if there is an attack
(2)
State modifications for action ui: when choosing
action ui at state s, we compute the budget impact and
set changes for state s′,∀j ∈ N.
s −→ s′ =

bs
′
f = b
s
f − cif
bs
′
c = b
s
c + c
i
c
Mos
′
= Mos\{i}
Ats
′
= Ats ∪ {j} if there is an attack
(3)
State modifications for action d: when choosing
action d at state s, we compute the budget impact and
set changes for state s′,∀j ∈ N.
s −→ s′ =
{
bs
′
f = b
s
f − cd
Ats
′
= Ats ∪ {j} if there is an attack
(4)
We define the transition probability with α and q(j)
presented in Section VI-C.
P (s, s′, a) =
{
1− α if there is no attack
q(j) if node j is attacked
(5)
E. Rewards
The value of the reward for transitioning takes into
accounts three criteria: the intrinsic value of the nodes,
the overall progress of the attacker, and the probability
of detecting an attack. The probability of an attack
occurring is already accounted for in the transitions.
If no attack was launched, the reward is based on the
value of all the nodes in the infrastructure. If an attack
was launched, there are two cases: whether the attacker
has reached his ultimate goal or not. If he has, we
deduct the value of all the compromised nodes. If he
has not, we only deduce the value of the attacked node.
We note Π(j) = 1 − (1 − p)|Lj∩Mo| as the probability
of at least one node detecting the attack on node j.
Therefore, we define the following reward functions:
R(s, a) =

∑
i∈N
Vi, if no attack
n∑
i∈N
Vi −
∑
k∈Ats
Π(k)Vk, if finalized attack∑
i∈N
Vi −Π(j)Vj , if partial attack
(6)
VII. USE CASE
In this section, we instantiate our MDP and perform
several tests with varying input parameters. We outline
specific behaviors shown in the MDP optimal policy. We
have generated the MDP using the topology depicted in
Fig. 2. We have considered two scenarios: a) the attacker
is located at node 6 only, b) the attacker is located at
nodes 3 and 6.
We make the simulation computationally tractable by
setting all financial and computational costs equal for all
nodes, i.e., ∀i, j ∈ N, cif = cjf = cic = cjc = cd = 10.
For eased reading, we note the cost ca. Simply put, with
ca = 10 and bc = 40 there will be a maximum of 4 nodes
monitoring the infrastructure. We set the discount factor
of the MDP to 0.9 since the consequences of an attack
are well-defined and can be precisely evaluated with
risk assessment techniques. We summarize the numerical
values of the parameters in Table I.
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A. Numerical results
We have run the MDP using different budgets and de-
tection probabilities. Nodes are migrated in the following
order: 1, 2 and 3. The ordering of the nodes impacts
the result sets of Algorithm 1, thus which nodes may
be attacked at each transition. We have extracted the
monitoring set of each absorbing state, and evaluated
the overall reward of each monitoring set. We define
the reward of a monitoring set as the weighted mean of
the reward of each corresponding absorbing state. The
weighted mean uses the stationary distribution of the
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Markov Chain corresponding to the optimal policy. The
results are shown in Fig. 4 for scenario a) and in Fig. 5
for scenario b).
Based on the paths taken by attacks and the ordering
of the migration, we can categorize the nodes into three
categories: source, intermediate and border nodes. The
scenario a) sets the source to node 6, nodes 4 and 5
as intermediate nodes and finally nodes 1,2 and 3 as
border nodes. The scenario b) sets the source to nodes
3 and 6, nodes 1,4 as intermediate and nodes 2 and 5
as border nodes. The first observation is that node 6 is
globally the most rewarding node in both cases. This is
explained as it is the source of most of the attacks, and
the exfiltrated data is redirected there. In both scenarios
the importance of nodes is separated according to the our
categorization. This implies that the more the nodes will
be on the path of attacks the more they get rewarded.
This is observation is reinforced in scenario b) where
nodes 4 and 5 are close to attack sources while nodes 1
and 2 are further away.
In both scenarios, the detection rate does not have a
significant impact on the ranking of the nodes, compared
to each other. The main trend in scenario a) is from
p = 0.6 node 4 does not overcome node 6 in reward. All
other nodes remain closely grouped, and no intermediate
or border nodes is standing out. In scenario b) the higher
the detection rate the higher the reward of node 3,
the secondary source of attacks. The steadiness in the
evolution of each node shows that the performance of
the detection is not a major factor in determining which
bf bc p ca γ
[30,40] [10,20,30,40] [0.5,0.6,0.7,0.8,0.9] 10 0.9
{V1, V2, V3, V4, V5, V6}
[10,10,10,5,5,5]
TABLE I: Parameters summary
nodes are best suited for the monitoring. We formulate
some hypotheses in Section VIII.
Detailed examination of the optimal policy for each
budget also shows that the action mj is never used to
redeploy resource elsewhere in the infrastructure. Instead
of unmonitoring nodes, the MDP chooses the action d to
preserve the global detection probability. mj actions are
only chosen when the unmonitored node does not detect
the next attack, thus having the same impact as action
d. These corner cases only represent a small percentage
of the global solution where very few attacks occurred.
B. A priori deployment
When solving a problem using an MDP, the solution
is a dynamic proposition to choose actions as the system
evolves. However, from a technical aspect, the defender
needs to have the nodes already monitoring the infras-
tructure before starting the migration process. It becomes
necessary to translate the dynamic answer of the MDP
into a static a priori deployment. After determining
the individual importance of each node, we propose to
determine the optimal set of monitoring nodes.
The main difference is that each node was evaluated
based on all the possible budget combinations, whereas
what is defined here is a particular answer for a spe-
cific budget. For each budget, the maximum reward is
bf
ca
∑
i∈N
Vi which corresponds to the corner case where the
attacker never launched an attack, and we can evaluate
the efficiency of the monitoring nodes thanks to the
associated reward. Even if a particular monitoring set
achieves close to the maximum reward, it is also because
the set is tailored to a subset of all possible attacks. We
propose to determine the optimal monitoring state for
each budget by weighting the reward they achieve with
their occupation of the total solution space.
We note Sabs the set of absorbing states, SMoabs the set
of absorbing states with a common monitoring set Mo,
ρ(Mo) the percentage of presence of set Mo in the
solution space and R(Mo) the reward of monitoring set
Mo. Then we propose to choose the optimal monitoring
set Mo∗ with:
Mo∗ = arg max
Mo∈Sabs
 ∑
s∈SMoabs
ρ(Mos)R(Mos)
 (7)
We present the results for scenario a) in Table II. We
observe that nodes 4 and 6 are always chosen in the
monitoring, which corresponds to Fig. 4. Node 1 also
often appears as a good candidate for a fourth node if it
is not already chosen third. With p = 0.7 we observe that
third and fourth nodes do not coincidate between (30,30)
and (40,40) budgets. This suggests that the combining
two nodes increases their individual performance. (Node
1 is surrounded by node 2 and 3 in the topology).
detection probability (bf , bc) Mo∗
0.5 (30,30) 2,4,6(40,40) 1,2,4,6
0.7 (30,30) 1,4,6(40,40) 2,3,4,6
0.9 (30,30) 4,5,6(40,40) 1,4,5,6
TABLE II: Optimal monitoring set - Scenario a)
VIII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we propose to discuss some of the
limitations and findings of our approach. The main
limitation of the model is the size of the numerical use
case. Since the MDP set of states and transitions are
generated recursively, the bigger the topology and the
budgets the bigger the computation time. Because of the
use of the mj action as an equivalent to action d, we
assume that the relocation of monitoring resources would
happen in bigger use cases, but those cannot be generated
due to combinatory explosion.
In Section VII-B we proposed a method to determine
for each budget what was the optimal monitoring set.
This method supposes that the ordering of the monitoring
deployment does not impact the rewards obtained. While
this is not true when considering individually each path
from the starting state to an absorbing state, the aggre-
gation of the results toward monitoring sets reduces the
impact of this assumption. In addition to that, we have
defined an attacker model in which the target decision
is not based on which security measures are already
deployed on the infrastructure, thus making the target
decision space independent from the monitoring.
We have observed the importance of the detection
probability in our use case and concluded that it was
not an impacting parameter in determining the optimal
monitoring set. However, topologies where important
nodes could be reached from several paths and where
there could be multiple data exfiltration paths could lead
to choosing intermediate nodes over border nodes.
IX. RELATED WORK
The migration of a virtual network is a subclass of
the Virtual Network Embedding (VNE) problem, which
consists in allocating a new physical substrate adequate
to support the operations of the virtual network. Migrat-
ing a virtual network in an SDN environment consists
in deploying flow rules in the destination substrate in
order to implement the routing behavior of the origi-
nal substrate. Migration may occur because the service
provider wants to transfer the virtual network toward a
substrate with a different QoS, because of a failure of
the network devices, or because the original substrate has
been compromised by an attacker. In [7], [20] Ghorbani
et al. leverages SDN virtualization to offer a seamless
migration of virtual elements by cloning and aggregating
network configurations across the infrastructure. From
the security perspective, [21], [22], [23] determine the
appropriate destination substrate to embed the virtual
network with regard to the client’s required security
level.
Linear Programming (LP) is particularly fit to solve
Resource Allocation problems since LP determines the
optimal way to spend limited resources. LP is a method
used to maximize a reward function constrained by
a set of linear equations. Network communications
have always been subject to resource constraints since
there can be an overwhelming number of users on the
same physical equipment. The physical constraints of
wired/wireless communications may affect the proper
behavior of the system as well. In [24], the authors
study resource sharing in cellular communications and
the underlying noise and interference problems when
devices communicate together. However, the resource
sharing problem they present is non linear and a division
of this complex problem into two simpler ones is pro-
posed and solved using LP. Similarly, in [25], Awad et
al. determine the optimal resource sharing in two-hop
communications relay networks, where users will com-
municate cooperatively with a base station and relay
stations to alleviate the load on the base station. Their
results show that LP can achieve a near optimal resource
sharing with a low computation complexity. Early work
related to defense is presented in [26], in which the
authors use LP to determine the capacities of a set of
sensors to track their target. More precisely, the authors
determine the maximum detection range each sensor
should have in order to ensure the proper tracking of each
threat. Providing a safe embedding for virtual networks
is studied by Bays et al. [27] as they model the security
properties of the resources they are allocating. Similarly
to previous works, LP helps determining the optimal
partitioning for network resources while ensuring the
required security level is always met. More details on
LP, its uses and related algorithms can be found in [28].
While LP works with a system where the optimization
is based solely on the point of view of the system owner,
there are other scenarios where the solution requires
to take into account the perspective of several actors.
Specifically, in network security, considering the possible
actions an attacker may do to compromise a system will
help in providing a better defense against him. In this
regard, game theory has proven useful to represent both
of these points of view.
The formalism of game theory in computer security
could describe the interactions between two (or more)
players: attackers and defenders. Players will either
attack or defend a particular system, and depending on
the choice of their opponent they will be rewarded.
Game theory allows to highlight the compromises made
by the players to optimize their personal reward while
accounting for their opponent’s strategies. Games can
be classified based on how players choose their actions:
either they choose simultaneously (static game) or they
take turns (dynamic game). One of the first work on
resource allocation using a static game is presented
by Kodialam et al. [29] where a model used for drug
interdiction is adapted to describe a link sampling op-
timization. They determine the sampling rate of each
link in the infrastructure to optimize the detection of
attacks. Another approach with static games is proposed
by Chen et al. [30]. For each node in the infrastructure,
attacker and defender will be offered the choice of
respectively attacking or defending the node or not. Each
player has a constrained budget and will have to choose
which targets will maximize their reward. Solving the
game gives the defender a list of valuable nodes that
will be targeted by the the attacker in priority, as well
as the optimal defense resources to allocate on each
of these nodes. In addition, the authors show that a
rational attacker will have no incentive to attack an
unprotected node because he will have other protected
targets worth the risk of attacking. Stochastic games are
a subclass of dynamic games, in which the actions of
players have an impact on the state of a system. After
both players make their move, the system may transition
to another state according to a probability function, and
the payoffs for the players may evolve. The dynamic
aspect of network configuration using a stochastic game
is studied by Zhu et al. [31]. They describe a zero-sum
stochastic game where the defender will have to select
a set of detection tools that will be deployed inside the
infrastructure, each with their own cost of deployment.
Meanwhile, the attacker will have to select an attack that
can only be detected by a certain tool. If the attack was
not detected, the system will transition from a healthy
state to a compromised state.
While a stochastic game represents the interactions of
two players on the same system, the Markov Decision
Process introduced by Bellman [19] is the reduction of
this kind of game to one player (agent). Precisely, the
agent will be able to choose, at any state the system is in,
an action that may lead the system toward another state.
Each action may result in a reward or a cost, based on the
model. Originally, this approach was used by the industry
to determine whether a machine should be repaired or
left to manufacture faulty products.
An MDP could be leveraged to tackle core problems
in cloud infrastructures, such as energy consumption,
resource sharing or service availability, where it could be
used to alleviate workloads or organize resources more
efficiently. For example, Wang et al. proposed in [32] a
Continuous Time Markov Decision Process to optimize
the revenue generated by the cloud infrastructure by
determining the optimal CPU power depending on client
requests and energy consumption. In [33], the authors
propose a discrete time MDP where, at each time point,
the user will have to choose whether he wishes to keep
using the current networking technology or switch to
another (e.g., from WLAN to 4G).
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a Markovian Decision
Process in which a Cloud infrastructure provider will
deploy monitoring resources on networking nodes in
order to protect a network virtualization service from
attacks. The attacks are targeting a particular aspect of
network virtualization, namely the migration of virtual
networks. We also provided an experimental prototype1
of MDP generation, solving and results analysis. Results
show that we can determine which nodes provide the
best security with regard to current attacks, as well as
how the dynamic aspect of the optimal policy can be
translated into an a priori deployment of the monitoring
resources on the nodes. When the attacker can launch
attacks from several sources, the impact of the nodes on
the monitoring is much more differentiated and gives a
better understanding of their role in the infrastructure.
As a future work, we will improve the model by adding
uncertainty in the attacker’s location thus alleviating
the hypothesis that the attacker’s location is known
beforehand. We will also investigate the correlation
between the different parameters to determine which
could be leveraged by the attacker to improve his results.
Specifically, the attacker could improve the positioning
of his attack sources or which nodes should be prioritized
targets.
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